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Abstract
When deciding whether to bet in situations that involve potential monetary loss or gain (mixed gambles), a subjective sense
of pressure can influence the evaluation of the expected utility associated with each choice option. Here, we explored how
gambling decisions, their psychophysiological and neural counterparts are modulated by an induced sense of urgency to
respond. Urgency influenced decision times and evoked heart rate responses, interacting with the expected value of each
gamble. Using functional MRI, we observed that this interaction was associated with changes in the activity of the striatum,
a critical region for both reward and choice selection, and within the insula, a region implicated as the substrate of affective
feelings arising from interoceptive signals which influence motivational behavior. Our findings bridge current
psychophysiological and neurobiological models of value representation and action-programming, identifying the striatum
and insular cortex as the key substrates of decision-making under risk and urgency.
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Introduction
Making risky decisions under time pressure can lead to
unfavorable consequences: ‘‘Act in haste, repent at leisure’’. This effect
is so well known that many countries even protect consumers
against it with specific ‘cooling off period’ legislation. How does
the brain choose under pressure? To date, little is known about the
neural substrates which determine the effects of response pressure
(or urgency) on decision-making behavior.
In financial decision-making paradigms, multiple components of
eachgamble are integrated in order to arrive at an optimal decision.
The expected value (EV) of a choice option is defined as the sum of
the value of each possible outcome weighted by each associated
probability of occurrence. Rationally, options with a higher EV are
favored, when all else is equal. However, EV maximization is not
sufficient to account for all behavioural phenomena which are
observed, such as risk aversion (where a surepayment is preferred to
a risky option having equal or higher EV) and time discounting
(wherethe subjectivevalue ofa payment decreasesnon-linearlywith
the associated delay). Influential models in behavioural economics
including expected utility theory [1] and prospect theory [2]
account for neuropsychological evidence [3], highlighting the
integration of cognitive appraisal with emotional responses when
making decisions under uncertainty.
Emotional reactions are typically faster than cognitive evalua-
tions [4] and may constitute ‘‘affect heuristics’’ which reflect a
speed-accuracy tradeoff during action-selection. Specific behav-
ioural effects are observed when urgency is modulated by means of
response time limitations. Information processing speed is
increased [5], risky options are avoided if EV is positive and
more frequently accepted if EV is negative [5,6], and greater
weight is placed on the negative domain, e.g. on potential loss [7].
On the basis of these studies, one can hypothesize that response
urgency modulates more than one aspect of choice option
evaluation, leading to heterogeneous effects on overall perfor-
mance, depending on the specific paradigm.
Converging neuroimaging evidence indicates that EV and risk
are computed in a distributed circuit, involving regions also
supporting emotional processes. These include the striatum, the
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (vlPFC), the parietal cortices, the
anterior cingulate and the amygdala [8] and more recently the
insula [9]. Striatal activity is hypothesized to encode EV
determined from the integration of multiple gamble parameters
[10]; further, the striatum is the main candidate region
implementing the speed-accuracy tradeoff and putatively acts as
an ‘‘urgency switch’’ [11] to maintain a balance between
decisional speed and accuracy [12,13]. To date, it remains unclear
to what extent these two aspects of striatal involvement in decision-
making are anatomically overlapping and functionally integrated.
The striatum receives cortical projections from the insular
cortex, which is emerging as a central hub in models of decision-
making. Here, information concerning potential risk and reward is
integrated with interoceptive (bodily) signals and the representa-
tion of time to give rise to momentary conscious experiences and
‘‘gut feelings’’ that strongly influence option selection [14,15].
Clinical reports show that when the insula is damaged, addictive
behavior is attenuated [16]. Patients with insula lesions also display
relative insensitivity to EV [17], and impaired adjustment of
subjective beliefs about risk through experience [18]. We therefore
hypothesized that physiological and affective signals related to
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integrated with information concerning EV and/or uncertainty to
modulate decision-making behavior.
In this study, we investigated the behavioral consequences of
subjective urgency on decision-making under risk. We used
concurrent heart rate monitoring and functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) to elucidate the psychophysiological
correlates and neurobiological bases of this behavioral bias. In our
task, participants were presented with mixed-gambles (see Fig. 1,
below) involving an explicit probability of winning, a potential loss
and a potential win, and chose whether to accept each gamble or
avoid the risk. As cognitive processing is influenced by outcome
feedback [19–21], we did not provide outcome feedback on a trial
by trial basis, aiming to study the separate evaluation of each
gamble, to probe the neural correlates of choice option evaluation
and of the resulting internal competitive processes in the absence
of learning and feedback-related emotional states.
Across trials, we varied EV and, in an orthogonal manner, the
uncertainty associated with each gamble, through the probability
of winning (pwin), the amount of money to be won (kwin) and the
potential loss (kloss). This resulted in three levels of EV (defined as
pwin 6kwin - (1-pwin) 6kloss): negative EV (risk-disadvantageous),
neutral EV (risk-neutral) and positive EV (risk-advantageous
gambles). We also defined two levels of uncertainty: probability
class 20%/80% (low outcome uncertainty) and probability class
40%/60% (high outcome uncertainty). We characterized outcome
uncertainty as being largest near pwin =50% [22], where the
probability of receiving a reward or a loss are similar. EV and
uncertainty were orthogonalized to test for distinct substrates
involved in processing these parameters, and explore how urgency
may differentially modulate their activity.
Our third factor, urgency, comprised two levels: high and low.
On each trial, a fast or slow spinning clock was displayed along
with the gamble to manipulate the subjective sense of urgency to
make a response. Participants nevertheless always had a time limit
of five seconds to respond on every trial (see Methods section), and
were aware that this was identical irrespective of the clock speed.
We predicted that participants would predominantly accept
gambles with a positive EV, reject those with negative EV and
exhibit risk-aversion on gambles where EV<0. We also predicted
that a higher level of urgency would reduce decision time [23] and,
through interaction with EV, would reduce performance accuracy.
Specifically we anticipated that under high urgency participants
would place fewer bets on positive EV gambles and bet more on
negative EV gambles. Emotions consist of both subjective and
physiological elements, and therefore, physiological responses during
task performance provide insight into emotional processes [24,25].
We predicted that manipulations of EV, uncertainty and urgency
would modulate the participant’s affective state in a manner that
could be indexed by stimulus-evoked heart rate changes. At a neural
level, we expected activation related to EV and/or uncertainty to be
modulated by urgency state in regions implicated in action-selection,
particularly the striatum and the insula.
Results
Behavioral responses
Effects of EV (positive, neutral, negative). As anticipated,
EV significantly influenced the percentage of trials on which
participants gambled (main effect of EV F(2,26)=115.8, p,0.001,
g
2=0.90), with significant differences between all EV levels
(mean6SEM, positive EV: 72%62%, neutral EV: 38%62%,
negative EV: 15%63%, all post-hoc contrasts p,0.001) (Fig. 2a).
There was also a main effect of EV on response time (F(2,26)=4.8,
p=0.02, g
2=0.27) which was driven by significantly faster
responses on negative EV trials (2290630 ms) compared to
neutral EV (2370630 ms) and positive EV (2450630 ms) trials
(Fig. 2b). Performance level, defined as the ratio of rejected
negative EV and taken positive EV gambles over the total number
of negative EV and positive EV gambles, was 7861% (range 60%
to 91%) across participants. Risk propensity, defined as the
proportion of neutral-EV gambles taken, was 3861% across
participants. A one sample t-test revealed that the group was
significantly risk averse on neutral EV trials (i.e., participants
tended to reject risk-indifferent gambles, t(13)=2.9, p,0.01).
Effects of urgency (low, high) and its interaction with
EV. There was a main effect of urgency on response times
(F(1,13)=14.7 p,0.01, g
2=0.53), with quicker responses for high-
urgency trials (2310630 ms vs. 2430630 ms). There was also a
significant interaction between urgency and EV (F(2,26)=3.7,
p,0.05, g
2=0.22) . Post-hoc contrasts showed that the effect of
urgency was significantly more pronounced for neutral EV trials
(2300630 ms for high urgency vs. 2450640 ms for low urgency)
compared to negative EV trials (2260630 ms for high urgency vs.
2320630 ms for low urgency), (F(2,26)=9.9, p,0.01, g
2=0.43)
(Fig. 2b). There was also a statistical trend between urgency and
EV on percentage bets (F(2,26)=3.0, p=0.05). Post-hoc contrasts
revealed that urgency differentially modulated the percent of bets
on negative and positive gambles (F(2,26)=13.7, p,0.01): high
urgency increased the proportion of negative EV gambles
accepted (1761% for high urgency vs.1361% for low urgency)
and decreased the proportion of positive EV accepted (6861% for
high urgency vs. 7661% for low urgency) (Fig. 2a). Participants
were not significantly more risk averse under high compared to
low urgency (37% vs. 39% on neutral gambles).
Effects of uncertainty. There were no main effects of
uncertainty on percent bets or response time and no interactions
with EV or urgency.
Figure 1. Example of gamble presentation. kwin represents
potential gain, pwin the probability of winning, kloss potential loss.
Participants were instructed to consider these elements together and
equally weight them when deciding whether to bet or leave each
gamble. A third of the gambles had positive EV (risk-advantageous), a
third negative EV (risk-disadvantageous) and the remaining EV<0 (risk-
indifferent). The clock spun at two different rates: slow or fast.
Participants were explicitly instructed that they always had 5 s to
respond. Trials were interspersed with null events (fixation cross).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020942.g001
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spinning clock influenced the subjective perception of time,
participants were asked to estimate short intervals under high
(rapidly spinning clock) and low (slowly spinning clock) urgency
conditions. This test was performed in the scanner immediately
after completion of the gambling task. Participants overestimated
the time elapsed under high urgency and underestimated it under
low urgency (1062% vs. 2562%, F(1,13)=20.5, p,0.001,
gp
2=0.59).
Physiological responses
Gamble presentation elicited a biphasic orienting response in
heart rate, consisting of an initial slowing followed by acceleration.
Averaging over all participants, the initial bradycardic response
peaked at 21.462.5 bpm, 1.8 s post-stimulus, with the subse-
quent acceleration peaking at 0.962.1 bpm, 5.4 s post-stimulus
(Fig. 2c).
For the initial slowing (1.5–2.1 s post-stimulus), there was a
main effect of urgency (F(1,13)=10.9 p=0.006, gp
2=0.46), with
greater deceleration under high urgency (21.860.4 bpm vs.
21.160.3 bpm). Further, urgency interacted with EV
(F(2,26)=8.8, p,0.001, gp
2=0.40), modulating heart rate decel-
eration for negative compared to neutral EV trials (p,0.001) and
for positive compared to neutral EV trials (p,0.05). Under low
urgency, neutral-EV gambles were associated with the greatest
slowing, conversely under high urgency, negative-EV and positive-
EV gambles evoked the greatest slowing compared to neutral-EV
gambles (Fig. 2d)
For the later heart rate acceleration (5.1–5.7 s post-stimulus),
there were no main effects of urgency, EV or uncertainty, however
there was an interaction between EV and urgency (F(2,26)=6.1,
p,0.01, gp
2=0.32). Contrasts showed that urgency significantly
modulated the difference in heart rate rise for negative compared
to neutral EV trials (p,0.05) and for positive compared to neutral
EV trials (p,0.05) (but not for negative versus positive, p=0.3).
Under low urgency, the greatest increase in heart rate was with
negative EV gambles compared to high urgency where neutral EV
gambles were associated with the greatest increase in heart rate
(Fig. 2e).
To summarize behavioural and physiological results, urgency
had a main effect on reaction times (high urgency elicited faster
response times) and heart rate (high urgency elicited initial greater
slowing) and significantly interacted with EV to modulate both
measures. EV had a main effect on the number of bets taken and
the response time. Uncertainty had no significant effects suggesting
that the probability of gain/loss has little effect on behavior per-se,
beyond its contribution in the definition of EV.
Neuroimaging results
Throughout this section, only significant findings are explicitly
reported. Those interactions that did not reach statistical
significance threshold have not been reported.
Effects of EV (positive, neutral, negative). As predicted,
positive-EV gambles (compared to negative EV) elicited greater
activation within the striatum (head of the caudate bordering on
the ventral striatum) reflecting greater reward expectation in this
condition. Neutral-EV gambles elicited greater activation than
both negative-EV and positive EV gambles bilaterally in the
medial prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortex; the contrast with
negative EV was associated with widespread differences, including
in the dorsal- and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex and cingulate
gyrus. Negative EV gambles did not elicit greater activation than
positive- or neutral-EV gambles in any region (Fig. 3 and Table 1).
Effects of urgency (high, low) and interaction of urgency
and EV. Critical to the main question of this study was the
observation that urgency interacted with EV in many regions
(Fig. 4 and Table 2). In particular, significant effects were observed
for three contrasts. First, the difference between negative and
Figure 2. Behavioural and physiological results. Main effects and interactions of EV, uncertainty and urgency on percent bets (a) and reaction
time (b). c) Average heart rate change (bpm) over single trials, dashed lines represent standard error of the mean. Main effects and interactions of EV,
uncertainty and urgency on heart rate (HR) deceleration(d) and later rise (e).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020942.g002
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ventrolateral and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, striatum and
insula: under low urgency, the response was greater for negative
than neutral EV gambles, whereas under high urgency the effect
was reversed. Second, the difference between positive and neutral
EV gambles was modulated by urgency in the orbitofrontal cortex,
anterior insula, cingulate gyrus, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and
caudate nucleus: under low urgency, the response was greater for
positive than neutral EV gambles, whereas the converse was
observed under high urgency. Third, the difference between
negative and positive EV gambles in the middle temporal gyrus
was modulated by urgency, i.e. the response was larger for
negative than positive EV gambles under low urgency, and the
effect was reversed under high urgency.
To corroborate the above findings, region-of-interest (ROI)
analyses were conducted on average activity in the caudate,
ventral striatum, putamen and anterior insula (Fig. 5). For the
caudate, there was a main effect of EV (F(2,26)=4.8, p,0.05,
Figure 3. Whole-brain fMRI results for the main effect of EV. Activations shown at the cluster-forming threshold p,0.001. See Table 1 for full
list of activation clusters and corresponding extents.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020942.g003
Neural Activity in Decision-Making under Urgency
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 4 June 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 6 | e20942gp
2=0.27) with stronger activation (BOLD signal percent change)
for positive than negative EV (0.2960.04% vs. 0.1460.05%,
p,0.05); neutral EV elicited activation of intermediate intensity
(0.2060.05%), without significant differences. Further, EV
interacted with urgency (F(2,26)=4.6, p,0.05, gp
2=0.26): post-
hoc ANOVAs revealed that the effect of EV was stronger under
high (F(2,26)=7.8, p,0.01, gp
2=0.36) than under low urgency
(F(2,26)=3.6, p,0.05, gp
2=0.20). In particular, the response to
negative EV gambles was significantly attenuated under high
urgency (0.1560.01% vs. 0.0560.01%, p,0.02). There was no
significant lateralization of any effect.
Within the putamen there were no interactions between EV and
urgency, and no interactions of EV or urgency with side.
Within ventral striatum, there was a statistical trend towards a
main effect of EV (F(2,26)=3.2, p=0.05, gp
2=0.19) which
interacted with side (F(2,26)=4.7, p,0.05, gp
2=0.25). Post-hoc
ANOVAs revealed that the effect of EV was significant for the left
(F(2,26)=6.4, p,0.01, gp
2=0.31) but not for the right hemisphere
(p=0.2). There was no interaction between EV and urgency.
There was a main effect of EV in the anterior insula
(F(2,26)=4.7, p,0.05, gp
2=0.27), with neutral EV gambles
eliciting the greatest activation. However, there were no
interactions of EV, urgency or side.
Effects of uncertainty [low (20/80), high (40/60)]. At the
whole-brain level, low-uncertainty gambles elicited diffusely
stronger activation than high-uncertainty gambles bilaterally
across regions including the insular cortex, the inferior and
middle frontal gyri, anterior and posterior cingulate cortices,
fusiform gyrus, angular gyrus, cuneus / precuneus and within the
rostral brainstem and midbrain. The converse pattern was not
observed in any region.
At the ROI level within the caudate, there was also a significant
main effect of uncertainty (F(1,13)=7.2, p,0.05, gp
2=0.4), with
stronger activation for low uncertainty (0.2160.05% vs.
0.1360.04%). In the anterior insula there was a main effect of
uncertainty (F(1,13)=15.8, p=0.001, gp
2=0.53), with stronger
activation for low uncertainty (0.3860.05% vs. 0.3160.04%), and
an interaction with side (F(1,13)=8.6, p,0.05, gp
2=0.38). Post-
hoc ANOVAs revealed that the effect of uncertainty was greater
within the left (F(1,13)=23.3, p,0.001, gp
2=0.62) than right
hemisphere (F(1,13)=5.8, p,0.05, gp
2=0.29). We did not observe
any significant interactions between uncertainty and urgency and
between uncertainty and EV in either the whole brain or ROI
analysis.
Discussion
Our results characterize how response urgency influences
gambling behavior, and which brain regions subserve the observed
behavioural effect. We successfully manipulated participants’
urgency to make a decision to bet or not bet on mixed gambles,
reflected in a significant reduction in response times on high
urgency trials and corresponding changes in heart-rate. Corrob-
orating data demonstrated that participants’ subjective perception
of time was altered when responding, in a time estimation task,
where participants significantly underestimated the elapsed time in
the high urgency condition and overestimated the elapsed time in
the low urgency condition. Therefore an altered perception of the
amount of time available to make a decision contributed to the
reduced decision time under high urgency.
Participants predictably avoided loss by gambling less frequently
on risk-disadvantageous trials (negative EV) and anticipated gain
by gambling more frequently on risk advantageous trials (positive
EV). EV also influenced response times, with participants making
Table 1. Main effects of EV (whole brain analysis).
kE Peak MNI coords. Side Structure
Positive EV . Negative EV
56 4.2 (58, 230, 210) R Middle temporal gyrus
40 3.9 (8, 14, 0) R Caudate nucleus
44 3.8 (54, 244, 28) R Supramarginal gyrus
35 3.7 (8, 46, 22) R Medial PFC, Anterior cingulate cyrus
72 3.7 (28, 6, 6) L Caudate nucleus, Ventral striatum
3.4 (214, 8, 24) L
Neutral EV . Positive EV
88 4.4 (240, 216, 16) L Posterior insula
43 4.4 (14, 278, 28) R Cuneus
53 3.9 (12, 58, 16) R Medial PFC, Anterior cingulate cyrus
38 3.8 (212, 248, 18) L Lingual gyrus
Neutral EV . Negative EV
619 5 (2, 228, 44) R Posterior cingulate gyrus
4.7 (210, 230, 42) L
4.2 (25, 242, 48) L
133 4.7 (216, 56, 8) L Medial PFC
3.6 (214, 68, 4) L
120 4.7 (56, 240, 34) R Supramarginal gyrus
192 4.6 (232, 36, 32) L Dorsolateral PFC
3.3 (232, 52, 28) L
73 4.6 (32, 34, 8) R Ventrolateral PFC
183 4.5 (240, 220, 4) L Posterior insula
232 4.4 (54, 24, 2) R Ventrolateral PFC
3.6 (58, 32, 8) R
3.4 (60, 24, 18) R
72 4.4 (12, 60, 16) R Medial PFC
88 4.3 (48, 216, 212) R Middle temporal gyrus
54 4.2 (224, 0, 46) L Superior frontal gyrus
439 4.2 (2, 32, 30) R Anterior cingulate gyrus
3.9 (22, 44, 24) L
3.8 (12, 48, 26) R
72 4.1 (2, 260, 224) R Cerebellum
3.6 (4, 260, 232) R
3.3 (12, 252, 214) R
66 4.0 (210, 22, 22) L Anterior cingulate gyrus
186 4.0 (242, 14, 212) L Anterior insula
4.0 (246, 6, 4) L
3.6 (238, 16, 0) L
63 4.0 (68, 228, 30) R Supramarginal gyrus
49 3.9 (4, 230, 230) R Pons
38 3.6 (26, 50, 22) R Dorsolateral PFC
3.5 (20, 54, 28) R
163 3.6 (22, 254, 12) L Posterior cingulate gyrus
3.6 (10, 248, 24) R
3.6 (2, 252, 22) R
No significant effects were observed for the contrasts not reported in this table.
The parameter kE represents the number of 26262 mm voxels in the cluster.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020942.t001
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EV). These observations support the findings of Tom and
colleagues (2007) who report faster response times to negative
EV gambles, indicating a preference to attend to negative stimuli
and a greater sensitivity to losses than gains [19,26].
Critically, urgency interacted with the EV of a gamble to
modulate behavior, heart rate and neural activity. At the
behavioural level, high urgency was detrimental to performance,
reducing the number of bets placed on risk advantageous (positive-
EV) gambles and increasing the number of bets made on risk
disadvantageous (negative-EV) gambles. It is suggested that the
striatum may mediate this behavioural effect by releasing motor
circuit inhibition to facilitate fast but possibly premature responses
[12]. We provide empirical validation for this proposal by
observing that increased urgency modulates activity within regions
of the striatum that encode EV. Our results endorse a model of
brain mechanisms for action-selection proposed by Redgrave and
colleagues (1999) which suggests that, in order to be considered as
Figure 4. Whole-brain fMRI results for the interactions between EV and urgency. Activations shown at the cluster-forming threshold
p,0.001. See Table 2 for full list of activation clusters and corresponding extents.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020942.g004
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exhibit certain properties, namely: 1) it should receive information
about internal states and external cues relevant to decision-
making, 2) it should support a mechanism to compute the level of
urgency to be assigned to each available action, 3) it should have
the capacity to resolve conflicts between competing actions based
on their relative salience and 4) its outputs should be modifiable
allowing the expression of winning actions while suppressing losing
actions (importantly, this does not necessarily embed the
requirement of a ‘linear’ relationship between activation level
and EV, and indeed the relationship was more complex in our
results). In this context, the striatum represents the putative core of
a decision-making / action-selection circuit [27]. As discussed
below, this circuit becomes engaged in a manner that depends on
value not only in a ‘direct’ way, but also in terms of deviation from
a situation of ‘risk-indifference’: In other words, engagement of
action-selection circuitry is augmented under situations of high
response conflict, as occurs in neutral-EV gambles.
The insula receives convergent information associated with
salient environmental stimuli across sensory modalities, and direct
modulation from the striatum [28], providing crucial capacity for
incentive and hedonic signaling. We showed that urgency
interacted with EV to modulate activity within insula (according
to the whole-brain analysis) as well as modulating physiological
arousal. While we are unable to demonstrate a direct relationship
between physiological responses and behavioural choice, evidence
from previous studies shows that somatic changes contribute to
decision-making behavior [29–31] and can relate to how well an
individual performs on a decision-making task [32]. Existing
research on heart rate responses to emotional stimuli identifies two
main markers: An initial bradycardia, thought to express
attentional orienting to motivationally-salient events through
parasympathetic activity [33] and a later rise in heart rate,
signifying emotional arousal through sympathetic activation [34].
Greater initial decelerations are associated with more aversive
stimuli [35], i.e. reflecting a ‘‘freeze’’ response. In the present
study, higher urgency trials were associated with a more
pronounced cardiac deceleration, 0–2 s following gamble presen-
tation (prior to a response), signaling a more aversive emotional
state (compared to low urgency trials). Since feedback and learning
were absent in this task, we suggest that such physiological changes
reflect affective components of the evaluation process itself, rather
than anticipatory changes or reactions to reward or punishment.
Urgency interacted with expected value to modulate both the
initial heart rate deceleration and the later acceleration. The
relationship between the orienting response (heart rate decelera-
tion), neural activation and behavioural choice in decision-making
is unlikely to be straightforward. The pattern of EV x urgency
interaction observed on heart rate deceleration was not observed
in the neuroimaging data, which indicate that, here, the regional
neural activity observed as BOLD effects does not directly mediate
the orienting response. The pattern of EV x urgency interaction
observed on heart rate acceleration resembled more closely the
interaction observed in the insula, i.e. greater heart rate increase
for negative EV gambles under low urgency compared to high
urgency trials, for which neutral EV gambles were associated with
the largest heart rate increase. This suggests that insula activity is
coupled to the sympathetic arousal generated by gamble
evaluation.
Previous studies illustrate direct associations between physio-
logical fluctuations (e.g. heart rate or skin conductance response)
and activity changes within the insula [36–38]. Our study
therefore highlights the contribution to emotional decision-making
of brain regions known to represent these homeostatic states and,
by implication, of those states themselves. Recent work relates the
degree to which the insula is engaged during risky decisions that
follow decisions involving no risk, to individual differences in
urgency / impulsivity traits [39]. However, in this study the notion
of ‘urgency’ differs categorically from that of the present study
(e.g., as a state varying within individuals depending on external
pressures versus a trait varying between individuals) as do other
aspects of the experimental design (e.g. presence of outcome
Table 2. Interactions between EV and urgency (whole brain
analysis).
kE Peak MNI coords. Side Structure
EV(Neg, Neu) 6Urg(+)
208 5.4 (228, 34, 24) L Ventrolateral PFC, Anterior insula
3.7 (226, 48, 28) L
3.4 (228, 42, 218) L
52 4.3 (20, 22, 210) R Ventral striatum
74 4.1 (210, 0, 16) L Caudate nucleus
112 4.1 (44, 248, 224) R Cerebellum
3.5 (40, 256, 228) R
79 4.0 (68, 26, 26) R Dorsolateral PFC
3.6 (56, 210, 30) R
37 4.0 (234, 28, 16) L Posterior insula
110 3.9 (264, 26, 20) L Dorsolateral PFC
3.7 (264, 26, 10) L
42 3.8 (24, 50, 28) R Orbitofrontal cortex
46 3.8 (26, 250, 0) R Lingual gyrus
3.8 (32, 256, 0) R
43 3.6 (18, 8, 8) R Caudate nucleus
3.3 (24, 16, 4) R
EV(Pos, Neu) 6Urg(+)
82 4.3 (14, 38, 218) R Orbitofrontal cortex
222 4.1 (242, 10, 10) L Anterior insula
4.0 (238, 26, 16) L
3.8 (238, 4, 16) L
38 3.9 (6, 22, 32) R Cingulate gyrus
77 3.8 (26, 220, 30) R
41 3.8 (214, 22, 14) L Caudate nucleus
56 3.8 (218, 234, 28) L
80 3.8 (254, 218, 36) L Dorsolateral PFC
3.7 (262, 212, 26) L
3.7 (262, 216, 42) L
36 3.5 (18, 8, 10) R Caudate nucleus
3.3 (12, 2, 8) R
EV(Neg, Pos) 6Urg(+)
180 4.5 (58, 224, 212) R Middle temporal gyrus
3.9 (268, 220, 210)L
3.6 (262, 244, 212)L
No significant effects were observed for the contrasts not reported in this table.
The parameter kE represents the number of 26262 mm voxels in the cluster.
The interactions expanded are: i) EV(Neg,Neu)6Urg(+)=[EV(Neu)Urg(Hi)-
EV(Neg)Urg (Hi)]-[EV(Neu)Urg (Lo)-EV(Neg)Urg (Lo)], ii)
EV(Pos,Neu)6Urg(+)=[EV(Neu)Urg(Hi)-EV(Pos)Urg(Hi)]-[EV(Neu)Urg (Lo)-
EV(Pos)Urg (Lo)] and iii) EV(Neg,Pos)6Urg(+)=[EV(Neg)Urg(Hi)-EV(Pos)Urg (Hi)-
[EV(Neg)Urg(Lo)-EV(Pos)Urg (Lo)].
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020942.t002
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anterior insula as a key region involved in time perception [40].
How this information is integrated in emotional decision-making is
becoming clearer, for example the insula and striatum are
conjointly active in immediate versus delayed rewards [41] further
supporting their role integrating temporal information with other
parameters during decision-making under risk. In addition to
insula and striatum involvement, dlPFC and vlPFC activation was
Figure 5. Region of interest plots for caudate nucleus, ventral striatum, putamen & pallidus and anterior insula. See text for statistical
results.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020942.g005
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The vlPFC processes motivational and emotional signals from
subcortical areas and computes the behavioural salience of
external events [42]; it is also involved in response inhibition
[24]. In our data, the dlPFC and vlPFC responded to the contrast
between neutral and negative EV, with enhanced activation for
neural EV gambles. This effect was, in turn, modulated by the
level of urgency in clusters in these regions. We hypothesize that
the dlPFC and vlPFC, insula and striatum operate together as
substrates for integrating affective information (e.g. related to
urgency) into goal-directed behavior. A more general question for
future research concerns how cortical and sub-cortical regions may
differ in their facilitation of action programming.
Interestingly, in this study the insula and cingulate gyrus were
most sensitive to gambles with a neutral value (EV<0) and within
the insula this effect was amplified under high urgency. An
influential model of anterior cingulate function concerns its
engagement in conflict monitoring, or ‘‘in situations requiring
selection among a set of equally permissible responses’’, a process
particularly pertinent to the representation of neutral EV gambles.
In particular, one can view decision-making as a competition
between processes promoting and inhibiting the performance of a
givenaction;insituationsofhigh-conflict,internalcompetitionleads
to enhanced activity with respect to situations where one action
rapidly wins over the other [43,44]. One alternative account is that
the conjointactivationof theinsula and anteriorcingulateto neutral
EV gambles mediates risk aversion, as a subjective, emotionally
driven phenomenon [45]. More specifically, we suggest that,
depending on the level of urgency, the dominant neural
representation shifts from an EV-centered one, where most regions
respondlinearlytoEV,toaresponseconflict-centeredone,whereby
under high urgency the striatum, insula and cingulum are engaged
proportionate to the level of deviation from a situation of risk-
indifference (neutral vs. positive or negative EV).
Uncertainty was negatively correlated with activation in the
insula cortex, the inferior frontal gyrus, the middle frontal gyrus,
anterior and posterior cingulate cortices, fusiform gyrus, angular
gyrus, cuneus/precuneus and within the rostral brainstem and
midbrain. That is, we observed greater activation in these regions
to gambles with probability class 20%/80% compared with 40%/
60%. Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that the proba-
bility with which a stimulus or response occurs modulates activity
in the anterior insula, anterior and posterior cingulate cortex,
middle frontal gyrus, ventromedial and dorsolateral prefrontal
cortex [20,37,46]. Typically, these regions become engaged as the
uncertainty associated with two possible outcomes increases.
However, these studies do not dissociate the neural signals
reflecting simple uncertainty of reward/loss from other decisional
variables e.g. EV or reward/loss prediction errors following
outcome presentation. Our findings therefore do not contradict
these observations, because there are fundamental differences in
task design and implementation across studies which are likely to
account for distinct differences in patterns of activation, highlight-
ing the complexity of uncertainty representation in the brain. In
particular, one cannot exclude the existence of multiple neural
representations underlying what appears to be a unitary definition
of uncertainty, and these would be plausibly engaged in a highly
task-dependent manner. Further, there may be effects related to
shifts in cognitive strategy: When the probability of winning was
close to 50%, especially under high urgency, participants might
have approximated EV computation with a basic comparison
between potential loss and gain, whereas when the probability of
winning was distant from 50% deeper processing would be
required to support choice option evaluation.
This study lays the foundations for further experiments detailing
the effects of urgency on performance and associated physiological
and neural substrates. This work could be extended to determine
the relationship of physiological effects and/or neural activations
with behavioural choice under different levels of urgency. This
would involve considering how participants’ choices (e.g. bet
versus no bet) predicted their regional neural activation and/or
heart rate change. The current experimental design did not permit
us to assess this directly but illustrates the differential and
integrative mechanisms associated with expected value, uncertain-
ty and urgency on brain and body during the evaluation of the
value of the options and associated risk. Furthermore, our
experimental design did not enable dissection of sub-components
of the urgency-inducing manipulation, for example effects of the
spinning clock on emotional arousal and visual attention. Future
work is necessary to qualify better effects of emotional versus
attentional modulations on decision-making and the underlying
neural activity. Beyond the mixed gamble design featured here,
there is a potential need to examine effects of urgency separately
within the loss and gain domains. The present paradigm is,
however, well-suited for further exploration and future use in
clinical and occupational populations, for example to study
patients with gambling addiction or investment bankers, who
likely exhibit different patterns of behavioural and physiological
activity under heightened levels of urgency [47].
In conclusion, we provide evidence that signals related to
response urgency are integrated with choice value information to
modulate neural activity in the striatum and the insula, with
concurrent changes in heart rate and gambling performance. This
work informs current models of choice-selection, in which the
striatum mediates fast but potentially inaccurate responses and
supports the integration of basic decision-making parameters.
Materials and Methods
Participants
Fifteen right-handed, healthy participants (5 male, 10 female),
mean age 25610 yrs, were enrolled after written informed
consent. The study was approved by the Brighton & Sussex
University Hospitals NHS Trust ethics committee (Royal Sussex
County Hospital, Eastern Road, Brighton, BN2 5BE, UK). All
participants were free from neurological and psychiatric disorders.
Design: gambling task
Sets of gambles were constructed based on three factors: EV,
uncertainty (probability class) and urgency (Figure 1). For each
gamble, EV and uncertainty were determined by independently
manipulating the probability of winning (pwin), the amount of
money to be won (kwin) and the amount of money that would be
lost (kloss). This resulted in three levels of EV: negative, neutral and
positive and two levels of uncertainty: high uncertainty (probability
40%/60%) and low uncertainty (probability 20%/80%). Urgency
was defined as a two-level factor, and determined by the spinning
rate of a clock presented alongside the gamble parameters.
Participants chose whether to bet (i.e., to accept a risk related to
the variable EV) or leave each gamble (thereby opting for a certain
EV=0 outcome). Participants were told that the outcome of each
gamble was not pre-set, but would be determined at the time of
response, and that the computer would track all earnings and
losses in the form of a ‘virtual bank account’. Participants were
instructed to respond within a maximum of 5 s, and that if they
did not respond they would lose the fixed amount of £20.
A fast event-related fMRI design was employed, with an
average inter-stimulus interval of 6 s and 9 presentations for each
Neural Activity in Decision-Making under Urgency
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experimental trials; 62 null-events of variable duration were also
inserted. The total duration of the task was about 16 min. Stimuli
were generated and presented using code developed in-house,
based on the ‘Cogent’ toolbox (www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/Cogent/).
Stimulus timing and order were optimised by means of optseq2
(www.surfer.nmr.mgh.harvard.edu/optseq).
Procedure
Participants were informed they would receive feedback on their
performance at the end of the experiment. All participants were
rewardedwith£15fortheirparticipation.Stimuliwerepresentedon
a projection screen, viewed through a mirror attached to the head
coil. Prior to scanning, participants were shown some sample
gambles to familiarize themselves with the stimuli and were
encouraged toconsider all three elements ofeachgamble,weighting
them equally. Participants were naı ¨ve to the concept of EV, and
were told not to attempt to perform any explicit calculation.
Following completion of the gambling task, they performed a time
estimation test to examine whether this was affected by the clock
spinning rate. For this part, the same clock was displayed, without a
gamble. Participants pressed a button when they thought that the
given time interval had elapsed. The time interval to estimate, i.e. 1,
2 or 3 s, was indicated before each trial.
Data Acquisition
Functional imaging was performed on a clinical 1.5 T scanner
(Magnetom Avanto, Siemens AG, Erlangen, Germany) equipped
witha standard 4-channelhead coil. SequentialT2*-weightedecho-
planar images were acquired with bi-commissural orientation for 21
slices, 5 mm thickness, no gap, TR=2000 ms, TE=50 ms, in-slice
resolution 262 mm, matrix 806128. Structural images were
acquired with a magnetization-prepared rapid gradient-echo
sequence, having 0.9 mm isotropic voxels and TR=1160 ms,
TE=4.44 ms, FoV 2306230 mm, matrix size 256x256, 50 slices.
Behavioral Data Analysis
For the gambling task a 3 (EV: positive, neutral, negative) by 2
(Urgency: high, low) by 2 (uncertainty: high, low) ANOVA was
performed with percent bets and response time as dependent
variables. For each participant, performance was calculated as the
ratio of rejected negative EV and taken positive EV gambles to the
total number of negative EV and positive EV gambles. We set a
minimum accuracy threshold of 60%, leading to the rejection of one
participant. Risk propensity was indexed by the average number of
bets on neutral EV trials. A standard threshold of p,0.05 was
assumed for significance of behavioural and psychophysiological data.
Physiological analysis
Heart rate changes were assessed through an MRI-compatible
pulse oximeter (Nonin 5400, Nonin Inc., Plymouth MN, USA).
The plethysmographic signal was low-pass filtered at 1 Hz and
processed with a peak-picking algorithm yielding beat-by-beat
heart rate measurements. The resulting signal was epoched in the
[20.5,5] s peristimulus range and averaged across trials. On the
basis of the grand average (see Fig. 2c), two measurement windows
were defined: [1.5,2.1] s and [5.1,5.7] s. Resulting values were
processed with a within-subject ANOVA as described above.
Imaging data preprocessing and analysis
Functional imaging data were analyzed using SPM8 (Wellcome
Centre for Neuroimaging, London UK). Functional scans were
realigned and unwarped, slice-timing corrected, and co-registered
with individual anatomy. Subsequently, all scans were transformed
into standard Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) stereotactic
space and smoothed using an 8 mm FWHM Gaussian filter.
At the individual level, design matrices were set up using 12
separate regressors, accounting for each combination of EV (3 levels),
urgency (2 levels), uncertainty (2 levels). Each event was modeled as
having a duration equal to the measured response time. Movement
parameters were also inserted as nuisance covariates. Statistical maps
were generated for each of the 12 design conditions, contrasting
activation for that condition with respect to null events. At the second
level, these maps were entered as a 36262 flexible factorial analysis,
which enabled us to determine the main effects of EV, urgency and
uncertainty, as well as their interactions. We set a voxel-level
threshold of p,0.001, uncorrected, to form clusters. Subsequently we
employed a Monte Carlo method, involving a full model of the
acquisition, normalization and smoothing steps, to calculate the
cluster extent threshold yielding an effective cluster-level a of 0.05,
which was 35 voxels; this approach has specific advantages as it is
parsimonious in terms of statistical assumptions and explicitly
captures the effects of the data preprocessing steps [48].
ROI analysis
Planned regions-of-interest (ROI) for the caudate nucleus,
putamen, ventral striatum and anterior insula were adapted from
the AAL atlas [49], by an experienced operator who separated the
anterior/posterior insula and dorsal/ventral striatum drawing on
the three planes on a canonical brain in normalized space.
Average BOLD signal percent change was extracted, averaged for
each ROI and analyzed by means of a 3 (EV) x 2 (Uncertainty) x 2
(Urgency) x 2 (side) repeated measures ANOVA. Bonferroni’s
correction for multiple comparisons was applied, accounting for
multiple comparisons within each ROI.
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